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The biological nature of agricultural production processes induce a higher degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the economic performance of farm enterprises. This has contributed 
to the development and acceptance of forms of public intervention aimed at reducing income 
variability that have no parallel in other sectors of the economy. 
In particular, subsidized crop insurance are a widely used tool. The impact of these 
programs on the decisions of production generates effects on input use, land use and thus, 
indirectly, environmental outcomes.  
The importance of this issue has grown in parallel with the growth in importance of 
the collective role of agriculture sector that has addressed the recent guidelines adopted by 
many developed countries. To examine the effects of public risk management programs on 
optimal nitrogen fertilizer use and land allocation to crops, this study carried out an empirical 
analysis by developing a mathematical programming model of a representative wheat-tomato 
farm in Apulia southern region of Italy.  
The model endogenizes nitrogen fertilizer rates and land allocation, as well as the 
insurance  coverage  levels,  participation  in  insurance  programs  and  the  Environmental 
Payment (EP). This study utilized direct expected utility maximizing non-linear programming 
in combination with a simulation approach. 
Results show that with current crop insurance programs, the optimal nitrogen fertilizer 
rate  slightly  increases  and  the  optimal  acreage  substantially  increases  for  tomato  whereas 
decrease for wheat. Assuming that the environmental negative effects of crop insurance are 
positively related to nitrogen fertilizer use, this type of public intervention implies negative 
environmental effects. 
 
Key  words:  Uncertainty,  Risk  Management,  Crop  Insurance,  Input  Use  Decisions, 
Environmental Externalities, Mathematical Programming. 















Agriculture  is  arguably  the  sector  of  production  where  factors  outside  managers’ 
control are more heavily responsible of the final result of the enterprise, something that has 
contributed  to  the  development  and  acceptance  of  forms  of  public  intervention  aimed  at 
reducing income variability that have no parallel in other sectors of the economy. 
In  this  context,  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries,  often  the  agricultural 
sector is characterised by fluctuating market prices, weather-induced production instabilities, 
insufficient  provision  of  inputs  and  lack  of  marketing,  infrastructure  and  facilities  which 
generated  through  the  years  a  strong  presence  of  risk  and  uncertainty  in  the  literature 
contributes.  
Historically,  risk  behaviour  of  decision  makers  have  been  studied  quite  well  with 
respect  to  individual  agricultural  producers.  Most  farmers  adopt  risk-reducing  strategies 
involving such elements as flexibility, liquidity, diversification, and are cautious in adopting 
new techniques and levels of input use that yield less than maximum expected returns.  
Consequently, both in the United States and in part of Europe, the attention of farmers 
and  their  representatives  has  focused  on  the  potential  offered  by  the  involvement  of 
governments in farm risk management programs. In this context, the opportunities left open 
by  the  exclusion  of  payments  classified  as  part  of  disaster  relief  and  income  safety  net 
programs from the aggregate support measure, on which reduction commitment have been 
taken after the 1994 Uruguay Round Gatt Agreement (URAA), have been considered too 
precious to be left unexploited. 
On  the  other  side,  a  strong  debate  in  the  past  arose  over  the  environmental 
consequences of risk management policy, e.g. crop insurance. In particular, researchers have 
addressed the question of whether or not the purchase of crop insurance induces farmers both 
to apply more or less potentially polluting chemical inputs and put in production marginal 
land.  
These  relationship  between  various  risk  management  policy  and  farmers’ 
agrochemical applications and land use remain unclear up till now for two reasons.  
First, in terms of intensive margin, the empirical evidence remains unconvincing as to 
whether chemical and fertilizer applications increase, decrease, or have no effect on yield or 
profit  variance.  Leathers  and  Quiggin  (1991)  in  their  contribute  states  that  chemical 
applications  reduce  risk  while  fertilizer  applications  increase  risk,  as  measured  by  profit 
variance measure. Alternatively, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994) provided some reasoning 
and  empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  pesticide  applications  increase  risk.  Babcock  and 
Hennessy  (1996)  and    Smith  and  Goodwin  (1996)  rebated  Horowitz  and  Lichtenberg`s 
argument and suggest that improper model specification biased their empirical results.  4 
 
Second, in terms of extensive margin, due to the design of crop insurance subsidies 
and  of  the  disaster  payments  programs,  higher  levels  of  transfer  payments  are  given  to 
comparatively  higher-risk  areas  of  production.  Since  many  producers  respond  to  income 
transfers by increasing production, high-risk areas are likely to see increases in production as 
well as increases in transfer payments.  
In this sense, it is important to stress that since premium rates are a reflection of the 
amount of risk associated with a parcel of land, then subsidies provide greater transfers to 
farmers who are operating under risky conditions. While marginal lands are not homogeneous 
across space, they are often associated with a particular set of environmental characteristics, 
the  most  notable  of  which  is  soil  erosion.  If  crop  insurance  is  promoting  production  on 
marginal  lands,  and  these  lands  are  found  to  be  highly  erosive,  crop  insurance  may  be 
contributing to erosion of farmland, build-up of sediment in nearby waterways, and other 
negative environmental impacts. 
 
Production’s behavior, risk management tools and environmental externalities 
The history of the CAP, which established in the past decades the environment to force 
farmers in pushing in production of food and fibre to the detriment of the quality of rural 
environments, has been seen as a cause of environmental quality decline.  
The  Fischler’s  reform  changed  the  way  in  which  support  is  guarantee  to  farmers. 
Moreover,  the  reform  represented  a  systematic  attempt  to  reorient  the  objectives  of  farm 
policy  to  place  greater  emphasis  on  environmental,  landscape,  food  quality  and  animal 
welfare objectives (Grant, 2003).    
There was five new key elements in the new CAP framework; the introduction of the 
decoupled payments, cross compliance, re-orientation of the CAP support towards to Rural 
Development policy by modulation, audit system, new rural development measures. 
In  this  context,  actually  direct  payments  are  conditional  to  the  respect  of  minimum 
standards related to environment, animal welfare and food safety, and modulation of direct 
payments was turned compulsory, so that each Member States is forced to divert a (small) 
part  of  its  direct  payment  endowments  to  the  resources  available  for  Rural  Development 
policies. 
The latest CAP reform acknowledged that the increased mobility and leisure time, added at 
the relocation of population towards rural areas have all acted to increase the marginal value 
of environmental and goods amenities.  
In this context, a new role has been attributed at primary sector, so that, production of 
environmental  goods  and  food  quality  and  safety.  This  new  role  is  justified  in  terms  of 
multifunctionality, which means that agro-environmental policies promote non-commodities 
output jointly produced with agricultural commodity outputs.  5 
 
Because  the  non-commodity  outputs  detain  a  public-goods  characteristics  there  is  not 
private market and therefore the State has a role in promoting agro-environmental outputs.  
Agro-environmental policy may thus be seen to create a “quasi-market” for these goods in 
that farmers come voluntarily into environmental contracts in return for a payment.  
For instance, in Europe, within the EU Rural Development Scheme framework, there are 
several  examples  of  this  kind  of  policy;  Members  State  implemented  and  receive  large 
“European”  subsidy  to  grant  these  programs.  Examples  include  English  Countryside 
Stewardship Scheme, the German MEKA programme, and the French “La prime a l’herb”. 
In short, while either of risk management and environmental policy received a specific 
regulation, remain unclear until now how these kinds of programmes could to act together, 
without offset both of them.    
Until  recently,  few  work  has  focused  on  the  potential  environmental  impacts  of 
government-sponsored risk management programs such as subsidized crop insurance and crop 
disaster payments (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1994, Smith and Goodwin 1996, Wu 1999, 
Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal 2004, Seo, Mitchell and Leatham, 2005).  
Among  others,  one  underlying  policy  question  is  whether  the  benefits  provided  by 
government-subsidized risk management programs are offset by the costs of such programs, 
including the costs of unintended environmental effects, and if risk management programs 
could offset environmental program as foreseen by Fischler’s reform. 
Government risk management programs, such as subsidized crop insurance and payment 
in case of disaster events, undoubtedly introduce potential distortion into farm-level decision-
making at both the intensive (input use) and extensive (land use) margins.  
Recalling the last WTO agreement previously introduced, and the recent Fischler’s reform, 
that settled a new discipline for environmental payments in European agriculture, e.g. linking 
decoupled  payments  to  cross  compliance,  we  would  make  clear  how  both  environmental 
programs and risk management in agriculture (Government financial participation in income 
insurance and income safety-net programs and, Payments -made either directly or by way of 
government  financial  participation  in  crop  insurance  schemes-  for  relief  from  natural 
disasters; art.7 and 8 annex II in Agreement on Agriculture in WTO) were expected into green 
box. 
From  this  point  of  view,  it  becomes  interesting  to  study  in  depth  another  relationship 
among risk management policies in agriculture and environmental policy; in particular, we 
refer to the content of art.8. 
In this context, a point of contention underlying this classification system involves the lack 
of  a  precise  definition  of  “minimally  trade-distorting”.  Clearly,  absent  such  a  definition, 
policies that may actually have effects on production and thus international markets may not 
be subject to the disciplines of the WTO; exactly as ad-hoc disaster relief payments.  6 
 
At this stage, however, intuition clearly suggests that agents will alter their production 
behavior with the knowledge that widespread crop losses will trigger disaster payments. The 
arguments is often made that, because disaster payments arrive after harvest and thus differ to 
production decision, they cannot have an impact on production decisions and thus, will not 
produce undesirable market distortions.  
Such an argument has some merit, but only if producers are surprised by the payments, 
which  is  not  in  our  case.  Rational  expectation  theory  suggests  that  anticipation  of  future 
opportunities  for  updating  base  acreage  may  influence  current  production  decisions,  thus 
breaking the “decoupled” nature of the programs.Producers’ behavior throughout the 1980s 
and  1990s  demonstrated  that  these  policies  were  quickly  incorporated  into  producers’ 
expectation; the likelihood that disaster payments would be received during periods of low 
yields almost certainly affected producers’ planting decisions. 
 
Literature review: intensive and extensive margin 
Impacts at the intensive margin 
Concerning  the  use  of  chemical  input,  early  studies  examined  the  impact  of  price 
uncertainty  on  a  competitive,  one-input,  one-output  firm  (Sandmo  1971,  Ishii  1977,  Katz 
1983, Briys and Eeckoudt 1985, Hey  1985). Sandmo’s seminal paper showed that in the 
presence of price uncertainty the risk-averse firm will produce less than if prices were known. 
However,  results  strongly  depend  on  the  assumption  made  about  farmer  risk  aversion. 
Connected to the results reached by Sandmo, Ishii later demonstrated that optimal output 
declines with increasing price uncertainty. Whereas in most economic sectors uncertainty in 
price may represents the dominant source of risk, in agriculture this eventuality may not be 
true
1; in this context, the literature on the field has been focused primarily on the impact of 
production (yield) risk on input use. 
Pope and Kramer (1979) offer one of the first models concentrating on production risk 
and its effects on input use. They consider a stochastic production function, a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function, and allow for inputs to either increase or decrease risk. In the 
single  input  case,  they  show  that  a  risk-averse  agent  uses  more  (less)  of  an  input  which 
marginally decrease (increase) risk.  
The first authors which investigate on the relationship among crop insurance and input 
usage were Ashan, Ali, and Kurian (1982). They show that in the context of a one-input, one-
output  model,  full  coverage  crop  insurance  encourages  risk  taking  (e.g.,  the  use  of  risk-
increasing inputs) and causes farmers to choose inputs as if they were risk neutral. Ashan, Ali, 
                                                 
1 We just need to refer to the framework of the CAP before the latest reform, where price were guaranteed at 
fixed level. 7 
 
and Kurian also argue that private crop insurance may fail because of information asymmetry 
creating adverse selection. 
Quiggin (1992) develops a model which introduces the conditions under which, due to 
the moral hazard problem, crop insurance would lead to a reduction in input use.Quiggin in 
his model has foreseen the eventuality of only two states of nature, good and bad, and he 
drawn as a result that the marginal product of an input is greater in the good state than in the 
bad, and that the insurance contract is not contingent on input use.  
One of the most cited contribute is referred to Horowitz and Lichtenberg work (1994). 
They  pointed  out  that  in  many  instances  pesticide  are  more  accurately  viewed  as  risk-
increasing, and thus their use may increase rather than decrease with crop insurance, while the 
conventional wisdom is that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs. In an expectation or planning 
context,  clearly  the  insurance  and  input  decisions  are,  to  some  degree,  simultaneously 
determined. In the context of the cross-sectional analysis data, three alternative hypotheses are 
relevant. First, the crop insurance and input decisions may indeed be made simultaneously. 
Moreover, Horowitz and Lichtenberg assume that crop insurance decision has to be made 
before  any  inputs  are  actually  applied,  so  that  the  input  use  does  not  influence  the  crop 
insurance decision. This is a strong hypothesis if we consider that crop insurance and input 
decisions could be made simultaneously.   
Since Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s contribute is dated at 1992 , before, therefore, of the 
Reform Act brought in US in 1994, same aspect in farmers` behaviour could be altered in a 
while.  Almost  immediately,  Smith  and  Goodwin  (1996)  criticized  Horowitz  and 
Lichtenberg’s  findings  that  multiple  peril  crop  insurance  could  force  farmers  to  increase 
chemical input use. They emphasized the strong linkage between increase in expected yield 
and the increase in variance of the yield, whether we consider an input as risk-increasing. The 
increase in variance positively affects the likelihood of an indemnity payment but the increase 
in mean yield offset it. The net effect is ambiguous. 
Smith and Goodwin doubt that the expected indemnity payment increases with input 
use for two reasons. First, chemical inputs increases productions cost, and lower (increase) the 
expected profits (losses) when indemnity payments are made. Secondly, the critical yield that 
triggers an indemnity payment is determined by the farm’s yield history.  Later, Babcock and 
Hennessy (1996) argued that the effect of increased fertiliser use on the probability of low 
yields primarily determines whether insurance purchases will tend to cause insured farmers to 
increase  or  decrease  their  fertiliser  expenditures.  Using  data  from  four  co-operating  Iowa 
farms growing corn continuously from 1986 to 1991 they conclude that increased fertiliser 
use, as measured by pounds per acre, strongly decreases the probability of low yields.  
Wu (1999) found that crop insurance for corn in Nebraska caused a shift in production 
from hay and pasture to corn. This could imply that subsidies for crop insurance may also 
promote environmental degradation due to the increasing in production which may result in 8 
 
increases  in  overall  chemical  usage  for  crops.  It  is  important  to  underline  that  this  shift 
involve into consideration either environmental externalities at the extensive and intensive 
margin. Wu also points out that an increase in chemical application rates may be due to the 
‘moral hazard’ created by crop insurance. 
More recently Nimon and Mishra (2001) followed a methodology similar to that of 
Smith and Goodwin. They focused their aims on the revenue insurance instruments and used 
survey data of wheat farmers` in seventeen states Using the aggregate measure the authors 
reproduce the Smith and Goodwin result for revenue insurance instead of multiple peril crop 
insurance.  However,  the  authors  found  that  the  environmental  impact  of  pesticides  and 
fertilizers may vary across space.  
 
Impacts at the extensive margin 
Literature  cited  focuses  primarily  on  studies  that  address  the  issue  of  acreage 
expansion and contraction occurring as a result of crop insurance and/or disaster aid, and the 
environmental impacts that result from these programs. While significant literature exists on 
the  impacts  of  crop  insurance  and  disaster  aid  on  crop  choice,  it  will  not  be  addressed 
specifically. 
Environmental organizations and interest groups are suggesting that subsidized crop 
insurance and disaster aid is encouraging production on environmentally sensitive lands by 
promoting production at the extensive margin. Subsidized policies such as those that have 
been offered in recent decades are likely to attract riskier producers and are characterized by 
adverse selection and moral hazard, both forms of market distortions.  
During the late 1980's, a few individuals began to realize that by providing a safety net 
of disaster payments and subsidized crop insurance, government programs may be directly 
influencing farm production levels and prices. In 1936 the editors of the Christian Science 
Monitor warned against the dangers of a crop insurance program encouraging production on 
marginal lands (Goodwin and Smith, 1996). While crop insurance, disaster relief, and the 
political climate that surrounds them have changed over the last half century, the warning 
heralded by the editors is still pertinent today. 
Plantinga (1996) illustrates that some government policies aimed to manage both price 
and  yield  risk,  including  price  controls,  crop  insurance  and  others,  could  cause  forced 
distortions in markets as well as farm-level decision making.  
He emphasized this point carrying out a study on the environmental effects of milk 
price supports, using county level data for Wisconsin. 
Plantinga  illustrated  that  reducing  the  price  support  for  milk  in  Wisconsin  would 
reduce incentives for profit maximizing producers to operate on marginal lands and would 9 
 
subsequently enhance environmental quality by reducing soil erosion and improving wildlife 
habitat through forestation.  
Yet in 1996 Griffin addressed the production impacts of crop insurance and disaster 
payments on planted acres in the Great Plains using two single equation empirical models 
with  time-series,  cross-sectional,  county  level  data.  Focusing  on  six  major  crops  (corn, 
soybeans,  grain  sorghum,  barley,  cotton,  and  wheat)  for  the  dependent  variable,  Griffin’s 
study  measured  the  impact  that  crop  insurance  participation,  risk  subsidies,  deficiency 
payments, and disaster payments had on total planted acres for the six crops for the periods 
1974-1977  and  1989-1992.  Results  suggested  that  roughly  16  million  acres  were  in 
production that otherwise would not have been without disaster payments, crop insurance, and 
risk  subsidies.  To  address  the  environmental  impacts  of  this  additional  acreage,  Griffin 
estimated the amount of soil erosion that could be attributed to the 16 million acres. In a crude 
estimate, the study suggested the amount of soil loss that could be attributed to crop insurance 
and disaster payments to be 61.4 million tons. 
Keeton et al. (1999) estimated the effects of disaster assistance and crop insurance on 
land-use patterns for the same crops in the plains and Midwestern states. More specifically, 
Keeton et al. tried to investigate on the possibility that government programs could push 
farmers in production to risky regions of the U.S.  
Cropping data was taken from 285 Crop Reporting Districts (CRD) for the years 1978-
1982 and 1988-1992, togheter with data on disaster assistance and crop insurance premiums. 
Changes  in  land-use  patterns  were  measured  by  the  dependent  variable  by  capturing  the 
change in total cropland for the six crops in each CRD between the two time periods. Keeton 
estimated  that  for  every  1-percentage  point  increase  in  crop  insurance  participation,  an 
additional 1.5 million acres are planted to the top six crops in the U.S. As pointed out in the 
study, such an increase implies that around 45 million additional acres may be in production 
as a result of crop insurance when including 30 million CRP acres. 
Lastly, Goodwin and Smith (2003) found that almost half of the reductions in soil 
erosion  due  to  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP)  were  offset  by  participation  to 
income  support  programs  which  positively  affected  the  raises  in  erosion  from  farmer 
responses. 
 
Non-linear Programming programming model 
The desire to reflect uncertainty of future events within decision-making problems has 
led to a number of risk models. Many of these risk models attempt to reflect the decision 
maker's expectations of possible outcomes and their probabilities, along with the decision 
maker's attitude toward assuming risk. 10 
 
  Linear programming is understandably often the mathematical programming model 
of choice when first addressing a complex real-world problem.  But only a small portion of all 
measurable real-world problems can be treated as linear to a sufficient degree of accuracy; 
hence, nonlinear programming (NLP) must be used to improve the model accuracy, realism 
and validity.   
  Several reasons have made linear programming models widely used: the model is 
uniform and easy to set up; the theory is well-developed, easily understood, "nice and clean"; 
the algorithms are easy to understand and to trust; data input and post-optimality analysis are 
automated  and  standardized;  large  models  can  be  solved  efficiently.    On  the  contrary, 
nonlinear programming models do not have a universal form and take a lot experience and 
expertise to set up properly. The solution concepts, e.g., KKT-points and local solutions, are 
elusive and most algorithms are sophisticated and take time to understand.  Furthermore, they 
are not as robust for large scale problems as linear programming and there is no guarantee of 
global solutions. 
Briefly, from Lambert and McCarl (1985) “by definition the expected utility of any 
distribution of wealth equals the mathematical expectation of the utility of wealth evaluated at 
each of the possible states of nature. If all increments of wealth are caused by the decision 
being considered, then wealth arising from a decision X would equal initial wealth plus net 
income due to X. Assuming that total wealth is a simple linear function of X and that  k C  is the 
vector of net wealth contributions per unit of X under the kth state of nature, then  X Ck  is the 
increment to wealth under the kth event. Total wealth under kth state of nature thus can be 
written:  ( ) . X C W CX W k o k + =  Using this relationship, the expected utility from a decision X 
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k Pr  is the probability of the kth state of nature occurring and  ( ) X C W U k o +  is the utility 
obtained from the wealth level achieved under state k with decision X.” 
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i j ij b X a   and  X>0.    This  formulation  is  inherently  a  nonlinear  programming 
problem (also called “direct expected utility maximizing nonlinear program”, that is, DEMP) 
Because  NLP  is  a  difficult  field,  researchers  have  identified  special  cases  for  study.  A 
particularly well studied case is the one where all the constraints g and h are linear. The name 
for such a problem, unsurprisingly, is “linearly constrained optimization”.  11 
 
Actually,  because  the  availability  of  new  algorithms  and  software,  the  number  of 
application based on NLP is raised, opening in this way a new scenarios in the risk analysis in 
agriculture.  
 
A possible effort of an empirical investigation by non-linear programming model 
Theoretically,  farmers’  enrolment  decisions  in  the  Environmental  Program  (EP) 
involve dealing with various sources of uncertainty.  
The decision to participate in the EP must be made in the face of the well-known 
revenue uncertainty of agricultural production resulting from variability in output prices and 
crop yields. As emphasized above, the purpose of this study is to develop a model of farmer 
decision-making  to  understand  how  farmers  formulate  their  participation  strategies  when 
deciding to enroll in the EP under uncertainty; moreover, if their participation strategies could 
be offset by risk management programs, such as crop insurance. 
To be clear, for example, consider two farmers who farm in different regions. For 
unsubsidized insurance one farmer would pay £10 per £100 of liability; the other £20 per 
£100 of liability for the same insurance policy.  In relative risk terms, the farmer paying £20 
would have yields that are twice as risky for the same insurance policy.  Given a 50 percent 
subsidy, the lower risk farmer receives a £5 per £100 of liability transfer and the higher risk 
farmer  receives  £10.  Any  expected  utility  model  for  risk  averse  decision  makers  would 
suggest that this design encourages both farmers to not only increase their level of production, 
but to possibly increase it onto riskier, marginal lands as well. Marginal lands make up what 
is referred to as the extensive margin or areas of farmland that are of a lower quality in terms 
of crop yield and productivity. Marginal lands are often located on the edge of production and 
are likely to be used given an increase in commodity prices or a decrease in production costs. 
The idea is that as a subsidy decreases, lower risk farmers would be less motivated to 
subscribe  crop  insurance  and  riskier  farmers  could  leave  their  production  (probably  from 
marginal land). How to model it? 
We could assume that the modeled farmer earns income by cultivating crops on total 
acreage S and purchasing inputs x = {x1, x2, …, xN} to crops j = 1, …, J.  
Farmer has also the possibility to subscribe a crop insurance contracts, characterized 
by  the  following  payoff:{Ij,  Mj}  =  1,  …,  I,  where  Ij  represents  the  random  (eventual) 
insurance indemnity and Mj is the non random insurance premium for crop j; moreover, at 
sowing time, farmer choose to entry in the environmental payments (decoupled payments), 
lÎ {0, 1}. If farmer facing revenue reductions of more than 30% of the preceding three years 
average, then disaster payment are guaranteed from public solidarity. 12 
 
Running the model, we assume that crop insurance and input decisions has been made 
simultaneously. This does not require that timing of the decisions be contemporaneous, but 
only that, the planning processes underlying both decisions occur simultaneously. It appear a 
logical  consequences  of  assuming  that  farmer  decisions  are  affected  from  the  overall 
economic  environment,  i.e.  government  risk  management  programs,  payment  in  case  of 
disaster events, environmental payments, which undoubtedly introduces a potential distortion 
into farm-level decision-making at both the intensive and extensive margins.  
At sowing time, total farm revenue P is plausibly based on the expectation made on 
price, yield and costs experienced in previous season, so that:  
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where E is an expectation operator; 
e
i p is the expected per quintal price of the ith crop; 
e
i y  
denotes the expected yield per hectare of the ith crop; cov (pi  yi) denotes the covariance 
between price and yield and underline the natural hedging mechanism among price and yield; 
ci is the per hectare cost of production.  
Per hectare revenue for crop j when crop insurance is subsidized, payments in case of 
disaster events are guaranteed and environmental payments occur is: 
  pijf = p'y'(xj) – cjf – r'xj + l EPj + Si (Iifj – Mijf )   
where p' is the vector of the the random price, y' is the vector of the random crop yield per 
acre as a function of the input levels xj, is the non-random variable cost, and r is the price 
vector of inputs x.   represents the environmental payments and l is an indicator variable for 
participation  in  the  environmental  program  (l=  1  if  the  farmer  choose  to  participate,  0 
otherwise). 
In this scenario, income per crop could be represented as  , j j S p  where  j S   is acreage 
planted to crop j, and total crop income p is the sum of income over all crops:   j
j
j S p p ∑ = . 
The  representative  farmer  maximizes  the  expected  utility  of  income,  choosing  the 
acreage allocation  j S , input use  j x , and participation in the environmental program l, and 
insurance program i:  
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The farmer’s utility function  ( ) · u  is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern  ( ) 0 ' ' , 0 ' < > u u , 
whereas  ( ) · F  is the joint distribution function of prices and yields.  13 
 








j S S ,  which  imply  an 
optimal acreage allocation and input use for each crop ( j S  and  j x  for all j), after solving 
optimization. 
In this way, as introduced by Seo et all, the intensive margin effect of the availability 
of crop insurance and disaster payments for a crop could be identified with the difference in 
the optimal use of input  j x  when the program are available versus when it is not. Similarly, 
we could look at the extensive margin effect as a changing in optimal acreage  j S  when the 
same programs are available. 
 
Empirical model: utility and profit 
Lambert  and  McCarl  pointed  out  that  “the  literature  indicates  that  E-V  analysis 
assumes  the  decision  process  is  characterized  by  (a)  a  quadratic  utility  function,  (b)  an 
underlying normal distribution of wealth, (c) a situation in which risk is small relative to 
decision maker wealth,  and/or (d) a situation wherein the E-V solutions are a reasonable 
approximation to the expected utility solutions (Levy and Markowitz; Tsiang 1972, 1974). 
These assumptions have been repeatedly debated: (a) the quadratic utility  assumption has 
been criticized because of its risk aversion assumptions (Arrow); (b) the symmetry implied by 
the  normality  assumption  has  been  criticized  (Hanoch  and  Levy);  (c)  the  small  risk 
assumption has been criticized because some situations do not involve risks which are small; 
and (d) the close approximation assumption (Levy and Markowitz) can be criticized because 
the approximation may not be close enough (see Hanoch and Levy, p. 344).”
2  
Due these introductory considerations, the authors wrote “However, it would seem 
desirable  to  develop  a  solvable  expected  utility  maximization  model  which  is  (a)  free  of 
restrictions on the forms of the utility function (particularly regarding the sign of the risk 
aversion parameter and its derivative with respect to wealth), and (b) free of assumptions 
regarding the distribution of the uncertain parameters.”
3  
In the past, due to the lack of adequate algorithms, large nonlinear programs have been 
difficult  to  solve.  Fortunately,  actually  modern  software  permit  to  implement  analysis 
otherwise unobtainable. 
In  the  following  section  we  conduct  the  analysis  using  direct  expected  utility 
maximizing non-linear programming (DEMP), combined with simulation approach (Lambert 
and McCarl). DEMP uses mathematical programming to find the crop acreage, input use, and 
                                                 
2 In, Lambert, D.K. and McCarl B., 1985. “Risk Modeling Using Direct Solution of Nonlinear pproximations of 
the Utility Function”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67 (4), p.847. 
3 Page 847. 14 
 
risk  management  program  parameters  that  maximize  expected  utility  as  a  function  of 
randomly drawn prices and yields. 
  Generally, as previously explained, it is too easy to get by with linear programming 
on a wide range of problems. 
Therefore, we utilized DEMP to maximize expected utility directly, by virtue of to 
using quadratic programming, recurring at Monte Carlo integration by simulate data mining 
from a sample of yield and price, under the hypothesis oh the distribution of these parameters 
(Turvey, Lambert, and McCarl).  
We recurred for the empirical analysis to a negative-exponential (constant absolute 
risk aversion) utility function. The beneath assumption imply in the model that the wealth 
effects does not affect production decisions. 
With negative-exponential utility ( ( ) ( ) c c q n - - = exp ), the DEMP objective function 
for problem (2) is:  
( ) [ ] ∑ - -
k
k Rp exp 1 ,          (3) 
where k indexes each state (Monte Carlo random drawn), R is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, and  jk
j
j k S p p ∑ =  is profit associated to the state k. Income from crop j in state k is: 
￿ijf = pk'yk'(xj) – cjf – r'xj   EPjk +  i (Iijk – Mijk ) 
which differ from the previous equation (1) only for the fact that each random variable has 
indexed by k. Values for R were chosen in accordance with the previous investigation carried 
out on the effects of the public subsidy at premium.  
In this context, the ARI insurance indemnities for any state k and crop j could be 







- = 0 , max
*
, , , jk j j ARI j ARI jk ARI y y CVG PEF I ,      (5a) 
where 
*
j y  is the average yield used by ARI.  
Differently from Seo et all, the non-random insurance premium for each crop does not 
depends on the chosen coverage level, esteemed that we settled the model only on one trigger 
level. This eventuality  facilitates the computation of the expected net indemnity which is 
equal to the expected indemnity minus the actual premium.  15 
 
Recurs  at  Monte  Carlo  integration
4  is  used  to  estimate  numerically  the  expected 
indemnity, since the integration required to calculate the expected indemnity is analytically 
intractable for the model. 
Simulation and simulation modelling are frequently used terms to define various types 
of models and modelling techniques. In the light of this inconsistency it may be necessary to 
narrow down the meaning of simulation to the purpose of this study. Pegden et al. (1995) 
define  simulation  “as  the  process  of  designing  a  model  of  a  real  system  and  conducting 
experiments with this model for the purpose of understanding the behaviour of the system 
and/or  evaluating  various  strategies  for  the  operation  of  the  system”.  This  is  a  general 
definition and one that is well suited to the use of simulation in economic-type applications. 
In agriculture, simulation models are routinely applied to biological system analysis 
(e.g., crop simulation or environmental models) and every time there is some uncertainty 
present  in  the  system,  which  can  be  modelled  by  sampling  from  appropriate  probability 
distributions.  
Following Greene, “In certain cases, an integral can be approximated by computing 
the sample average of a set of function values. The approach taken here was to interpret the 
integral as an expected value. We then had to establish that the mean we were computing was 
finite. Our basic statistical result for the behavior of sample means implies that with a large 
enough sample, we can approximate the integral as closely as we like.  
The general approach is widely applicable in Bayesian econometrics and has begun to 
appear  in  classical  statistics  and  econometrics  as  well.”Green  consider  the  general 
computation, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∫ =
U
L
dx x g x f x F ,  
where g(x) is a continuous function in the range [L, U], and further, he suppose that g(x) is 
nonnegative in the entire range. “To normalize the weighting function, we suppose, as well, 
that  ( ) ∫ =
U
L
dx x g K , is a know constant. Then h(x)=g(x)/K is a probability function in the range 
because it satisfies the axioms of probability.  
Let  ( ) ( ) ∫ =
x
L
dt t h x H . 
Then H(L)=0, H(U)=1, H’(x)=h(x)>0, and so on.  
Then  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






x f KE dx
K
x g
x f K dx x g x f ,
 
                                                 
4 Greene pp. 181-183 16 
 
where we use the notation  ( ) ( ) [ ] x f KE x h  to denote the expected value of the function f(x) when 
x is drawn from the population with probability density function h(x). We assume that this 
expected value is a finite constant”  
Thus the expected indemnity is the average indemnity for each policy over all states 
( ) ∑
k
ij ij ijk CVG PEF I k , : . 
 
Crop Production Function  
Random crop yield follows a beta distribution with mean and variance that depend on 
the dosage of applied nitrogen fertilizer. The beta distribution detects the property previously 
introduced
5.  
Using a conditional beta density for crop yield requires specifying or estimating the 
mean  y m  and the variance 
2
y s  as functions of the nitrogen fertilizer rate, and then substituting 
these functions into equations 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) A B
A B A
y
y y y y
-





m s m m
n   and 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) A B
B B A
y
y y y y
-





m s m m
g  
 by obtain equations for ν and γ. 
With this conditional distribution for yield, implicitly the farmer directly chooses the 
mean  and  the  variance  of  the  yield  distribution  when  apply  the  nitrogen  fertilizer  rate. 
Following the Nelson and Preckel conditional yield distribution, the farmer’s choice of the 
nitrogen fertilizer rate even affect indirectly the mean and variance of the yield distribution, 
through the approximating functions used for the parameters ν and γ.  
For this analysis, the functions for the dependence of the mean and variance of wheat 
and tomato yield on the nitrogen application rate were estimated using data from experiments 
conducted between 2003 and 2005 in Apulia region, Foggia province. Nitrogen fertilizer rates 
were experimentally varied from 0 to 300 q/ha and correspondently wheat and tomato yields 
has been measured for each plot for a total of 53 observations.  
A  quadratic  equation  identifies  the  final  result  for  mean  and  variance  with  all 
estimated coefficients significant at the 5% level. 
                                                 
5 See page 113. 17 
 
The final equations for the mean (µ) and variance (s) of durum wheat and tomato 
yield, respectively, as a function of the nitrogen rate (x) are: 
µw = 112.4 + 23.87xw – 0.108xw
2 
sw
2 = 16455+ 367.3xw + 3100xw
2  and, 
µt = 189,89 + 34,56xt – 0.342xt
2 
st
2 = 23456+ 546,78xt + 4560xt
2   
The model was solved using the nonlinear program (NLP) solver included in GAMS 
(General  Algebraic  Modeling  System).  Simulation  for  draw  yields  from  the  assumed 
distribution, and prices were carried out by Excel. The optimal fertilizer rate was determined 
as an integer variable by specifying fertilizer rates in 0.1 q/ha increments centered at the 
province mean for each crop; the fertilizer rate implied also the level of the mean and variance 
of the yields.  
GAMS  interfaced  with  Excel  by  the  GDXXRW  program  distributed  with  GAMS. 
GAMS sends the required means and variances to Excel, then Excel generates appropriately 
correlated yields and prices using the method of Richardson and Condra, as suggested from 
McCarl to Seo et all.  
 
Empirical Results and main conclusions 
Table 1 report the optimal fertilizer use and acreage allocation when the subsidized 
insurance program is available. Unsurprisingly, our results shows that crop insurance both 
generally have a positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both wheat and 
tomato.  Depending  on  the  crop  and  the  farmer’s  level  of  risk  aversion,  the  optimal  rate 
increases about 5 q/ha. Crop insurance has a large effect on the optimal acreage allocation. 
When  ARI  is  available,  optimal  tomato  acreage  almost  doubles,  accompanied  by  an 
appropriate decrease in wheat hectares.  
The results in table 1 also show that as farmer risk aversion increases, the optimal 
nitrogen rate decreases for all alternatives regardless of the crop because nitrogen is used as a 
risk  increasing  input.  In  addition,  optimal  tomato  acreage  decreases  and  optimal  wheat 
acreage increases, because tomato is the riskier crop. For the range of risk aversion levels 
explored, the optimal insurance coverage level slightly changed both for tomato, but increased 
for wheat.  
In our study, crop insurance positively affected both crops at intensive margin. It is 
incorrect for us to compare our result with others reached in the past; because the different 
methodology  utilized  and  different  area  investigated,  it  is  not  possible  to  compare  our 
conclusions.  18 
 
Regardless of the yield distribution, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it 
optimal  to  bear  more  risk  and  so  choose  fertilizer  rates  accordingly.  Considering  our 
conditional yield distributions, this implies an increase in the fertilizer rate. However, settled 
that the farmer simultaneously chooses the crop acreage allocation and insurance coverage, 
focusing only on the variance effect of fertilizer on crop yields is a misplaced simplification 
of our analysis. 
Once  again, because conducted in a different scenario,  would be prudent to avoid 
assimilating our analysis to other carried out in the past.  
 
Table 1 - Optimal farmer choice at intensive and extensive margin 
  Moderately risk averse
a  Highly risk averse
a 
 
Tomato  Wheat  Tomato  Wheat 
  Optimal Nitrogen Fertilizers Rate (q/ha) 
Government program   
EP only
b 
23,56  1,54  19,97  0,23 
ARI and EP
C 
28,87  6,28  25,13  4,98 
 
  Optimal Acreage Allocation (ha) 
Government program   
EP only
b 
,93  4,56  ,87  1,52 
ARI and EP
C 
4,89  1,13  2,75  8,72 
 
a Coefficients of absolute risk aversion are 4.0 x 10
-6 and 7.0 x 10
-6 for moderately and highly 
risk averse, respectively. 
b MLP means the Marketing Loan Program. 
c APH means the Actual Production History yield insurance. 
d CRC means the Crop Revenue Coverage revenue insurance. 
e Optimal choice when both insurance programs are available is APH for cotton and CRC for 
sorghum. 19 
 
The  environmental  impacts  of  agricultural  production  activities  continue  to  play  a 
significant role in policy debates concerning the role of the government in the agricultural 
sector of the economy. It has been argued that government policies that reduce the production 
risk  facing  a  producer  create  potential  incentives  for  the  producer  to  undertake  activities 
harmful to the environment. For example, the provision of public-subsidized crop insurance 
may encourage producers to bring economically marginal land into production. If that land is 
also  more  environmentally  fragile  than  land  already  in  production,  this  reduction  in  risk 
provided  by  public-subsidized  crop  insurance  could  lead  to  a  reduction  in  environmental 
quality.  In  addition  to  crop  insurance,  the  government  has  provided  a  myriad  of  other 
programs  designed,  among  other  things,  to  provide  income  support  and  reduce  income 
variability in the agricultural sector.  
Some  of  these  program  payments  are  linked  yet  to  the  current  production  of  a 
particular crop, while other program payments are decoupled from current production. 
If these programs provide incentives to expand production on the extensive margin, 
they may also lead to reductions in environmental amenities. 
In addition to encouraging production on environmentally fragile land, agricultural 
subsidy and risk management policies provide incentives for producers to alter crop mix, 
cropping practices (including input use), and conservation practices. If a crop receives higher 
deficiency  payments  or  insurance  premium  subsidies,  farmers  have  an  incentive  to  alter 
production in favour of that crop. If that crop also requires more extensive cultivation and 
input use, this shift will lead to a reduction in environmental amenities. 
Government  payments  that  increase  the  current  return  to  crop  production  may 
discourage the implementation of conservation practices that may increase or maintain long-
term crop yields at the expense of short-term yield. Government payments that increase the 
return  to  crop  production  may  also  decrease  the  incentive  to  shift  land  into  less 
environmentally damaging uses, such as pasture or range. 
While much attention has been focused on the impact of government policies on water 
quality, soil erosion is a key indicator of changes in environmental quality. The extent of soil 
erosion on agricultural land is dependent on the specific use of the land (e.g., cultivated vs. 
noncultivated  cropland),  the  level  of  cover  vegetation,  the  physical  and  chemical 
characteristics of the soil, and the agricultural practices (including cropping and conservation) 
employed on the land. If agricultural subsidy and risk management policies have the potential 
to  alter  land  use,  cropping  practices,  and  conservation  practices,  they  may  contribute  to 
increases in soil erosion. In addition to reducing future crop yields, soil erosion increases 
leaching  and  surface  runoff  which  contributes  to  water  quality  degradation,  habitat 
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